Episodic temporal generalisation: A developmental study. by McCormack, Teresa et al.
Episodic temporal generalisation: A developmental study.
McCormack, T., Wearden, J. H., Smith, M., & Brown, G. D. A. (2005). Episodic temporal generalisation: A
developmental study. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A: Human Experimental Psychology,
58, 693-704.
Published in:
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology A: Human Experimental Psychology
Document Version:
Early version, also known as pre-print
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:15. Feb. 2017
This article was downloaded by: [The Library at Queens]
On: 09 March 2012, At: 01:59
Publisher: Psychology Press
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
The Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology Section A:
Human Experimental Psychology
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pqja20
Episodic temporal generalization: A
developmental study
T. McCormack a , J. H. Wearden b , M. C. Smith c & G. D.A.
Brown c
a Queen′s University, Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK
b University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
c University of Warwick, Warwick, UK
Available online: 17 Feb 2007
To cite this article: T. McCormack, J. H. Wearden, M. C. Smith & G. D.A. Brown (2005):
Episodic temporal generalization: A developmental study, The Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology Section A: Human Experimental Psychology, 58:4, 693-704
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02724980443000250
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-
conditions
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.
Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-
licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly
forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any
representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The
accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently
verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss,
actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of
the use of this material.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [T
he
 L
ibr
ary
 at
 Q
ue
en
s] 
at 
01
:59
 09
 M
arc
h 2
01
2 
THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
2005, 58A (4), 693–704
Episodic temporal generalization: 
A developmental study
T. McCormack
Queen’s University, Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK
J. H. Wearden
University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
M. C. Smith and G. D. A. Brown
University of Warwick, Warwick, UK
Groups of 5-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults completed either an episodic temporal
generalization task, in which no stimuli were repeated, or a repeated standard temporal
generalization task, in which there was a fixed standard that was repeated on every trial.
Significant developmental improvements were found on both tasks. In both tasks, gradients of
performance over two different stimulus ranges superimposed well when plotted on the same
relative scale. Performance was similar for the adults and 10-year-olds across tasks, but the 
5-year-olds performed better on the repeated standard task. These findings suggest that
perceptual processes are a source of scalar variability in timing, and that there are developmental
changes in levels of such variability.
A key Piagetian claim has been that perception and estimation of duration are dependent on
mastery of concepts of time and measurement (see Levin, 1992, for a comprehensive review
of this research). The ability to ignore irrelevant stimulus dimensions and to make reasoned
temporal judgements is thought to emerge along with other changes in logical thought (see
Pouthas, 1993, for discussion). Developmental studies carried out in the Piagetian tradition
have provided valuable insights into the nature of children’s reasoning about time and into
how this can affect their judgements of duration. However, adult research suggests there are
some simple timing tasks that may require limited conceptual resources and that may involve
processes that are quite different from more complex tasks in which memory and reasoning
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694 McCORMACK ET AL.
are heavily involved (Block, 1990; Wearden, 1994). Indeed, much recent research on the
development of timing has been carried out largely with the framework of Scalar Expectancy
Theory (SET; Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984), a framework that was originally developed
as a model of animal rather than human timing.
SET has been the most widely applied theory of animal timing, and a number of well-
specified models of timing that have emerged within this theoretical tradition can account
for a broad range of animal data (Allan, 1998). More recently, this model has been success-
fully extended to account for human data from tasks that are analogous to those used with
animals (Allan & Gibbon, 1991; Wearden, 1991, 1992, 1994; Wearden & Ferrara, 1995, 1996).
The details of models have varied, as have the descriptions of the decision rules used to make
timing judgements (in particular, decision rules may vary between animals and humans;
Wearden, 1992; Wearden & Lejeune, 1993). However, all models in this tradition are char-
acterized by the scalar property: that the sensitivity of timing judgements is independent of
particular time intervals being considered (an instance of Weber’s law). Explanations of
developmental changes in timing behaviour within this framework typically refer to changes
in basic timing mechanisms and/or the memory and decision processes that operate on their
output (Droit-Volet, 2002; Droit-Volet, Clement, & Wearden, 2001; Droit-Volet & Wearden,
2001; McCormack, Brown, Maylor, Darby, & Green, 1999; McCormack, Brown, Maylor,
Richardson, & Darby, 2002; Wearden, Wearden, & Rabbitt, 1997b). The aim of this paper is
to examine sources of developmental improvement in timing more closely. In particular, we
examine whether such improvement reflects more accurate perception of, or better long-term
memory for, intervals of time.
There are three processing levels in SET clock-comparison models such as that of
Gibbon et al. (1984): clock processes, memory processes, and decision processes. At the
clock level, perception of the onset of a to-be-timed duration signals the closing of a switch
that allows pulses from a pacemaker to an accumulator. Memory representations are formed
from the information in the accumulator, are held in working memory, and, if they are of
behavioural significance, are transferred to long-term or reference memory. Typically,
decision processes compare time representations in working memory with representations
that are retrieved from reference memory. The extent of the similarity between the 
representation of a just-presented interval and the representation of an interval retrieved
from memory predicts the response.
One of the most commonly used tasks within the SET framework is the temporal general-
ization task (Church & Gibbon, 1982; Wearden, 1992; Wearden, Denovan, Fakhri, & Haworth,
1997a). In this task, participants are pre-exposed to a single standard or reference duration.
In the test phase of the task, they have to judge whether or not other comparison stimuli are
identical in duration to the standard. Plots of the proportion of positive responses given to
test stimulus durations yield a generalization gradient that typically peaks at the standard
and declines with distance from it. A SET-consistent model would capture performance on
such a task as follows. On the basis of the output of the clock processes, a representation of
the standard duration is formed in reference memory. On any given test trial, a sample of the
standard is retrieved from reference memory and compared to a representation of the 
just-presented duration. If the two are sufficiently similar, the just-presented duration will
be judged as being the standard. SET models describe such processes mathematically 
(see Wearden, 1992).
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EPISODIC TEMPORAL GENERALIZATION  695
Orderly data from such tasks have been obtained from children as young as three 
(Droit-Volet et al., 2001), and a number of studies have found consistent developmental dif-
ferences in levels of performance, as indexed by the steepness of the temporal generalization
gradient (Droit-Volet, 2002; Droit-Volet et al., 2001; McCormack et al., 1999; Wearden et
al., 1997b). Such developmental changes in performance have typically been modelled in
one of two ways. Droit-Volet (2002; Droit-Volet et al., 2001) has assumed that there is
variability in the sampling of the standard from long-term memory, with the amount of vari-
ability being proportional to the magnitude of the duration, yielding the scalar property.
Such an assumption is extremely common in SET models of timing (see Wearden, 1999, for
discussion). Developmental changes in the steepness of the generalization gradient are then
modelled by assuming that this memory variability declines with age (see Wearden et al.,
1997b, for a similar model of the decline of timing abilities with old age). This model
assumes noise-free perception of the to-be-judged test stimuli. However, McCormack et al.
(1999; see also McCormack, Brown, Smith, & Brock, 2004) made the alternative assump-
tion: that the perception of each test stimulus (rather than the memory of the standard) is
susceptible to noise that is proportional to the magnitude of the duration, which again yields
the scalar property. They modelled developmental changes by assuming that the level of
perceptual noise declines with age (see also McCormack et al., 2002).
For the sake of parsimony, both of these alternatives assume a single source of scalar
variability, and the developmental data modelled do not allow us to decide which is the correct
assumption regarding that source. However, recent research on human adults has specifi-
cally examined whether perceptual processes make an important contribution to variability
in timing and, if so, whether perceptual variance possesses the scalar property. This research
has used tasks in which reference memory of standards cannot be exploited. Wearden and
Bray (2001) developed an “episodic” version of the generalization task, in which stimulus
durations were never repeated. Instead, each test trial consisted of a pair of to-be-compared
stimuli, for which participants made a same/different judgement. One of the stimuli in the
pair was labelled the sample, and the other the comparison stimulus, although the sample was
never repeated (i.e., there was no standard or reference duration in this task; the sample
was drawn from a particular distribution of durations). The ratio of the stimuli to each other
was always one of a set of fixed values increasing and decreasing relative to 1, and gradients were
plotted of the number of positive responses to comparison pairs as a function of their ratio.
This gradient resembled usual temporal generalization gradients in that it peaked at 1 (when
the stimuli are in fact identical) and declined in an orderly way with increasing or decreasing
ratio. The scalar property was examined by varying the range of the distribution from which
the sample stimulus was drawn. Wearden and Bray found very similar generalization
gradients over different stimulus ranges, especially with auditorily presented stimuli (i.e., they
demonstrated superimposition). They concluded that the clock processes themselves may be
the source of scalar variability, since, as the sample stimulus was never repeated, long-term
memory processes could not have been recruited.
A similar conclusion was reached by Rodriguez-Girones and Kacelnik (2001), using a
modified version of a related task (temporal bisection; see also Wearden & Bray, 2001). On
each trial, participants heard two stimuli, one after another. They then had to judge whether
a third stimulus was more similar in duration to the first or to the second stimulus that they
had heard. Rodriguez-Girones and Kacelnik compared two task conditions: In one condition
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the first two stimuli were always standards that were repeatedly presented on every trial, and
in the other condition the first two stimuli were never repeated so that reference memory
representations could not be formed and recruited. They reasoned that if the main source of
variability in such judgements was reference memory (i.e., mnemonic variance), performance
should not benefit in the former condition because participants would not use information
from the less reliable reference memory. If in contrast the main source of variability was at the
level of perceptual processes (i.e., perceptual variance), performance should be less accurate
in the latter condition. In fact, performance was less accurate when no memory representa-
tions could be exploited. Therefore, along with Wearden and Bray (2001), they concluded
that perceptual processes are an important source of variance in human timing. It is impor-
tant to note that Rodriguez-Girones and Kacelnik (2001) use the term “perceptual” in a
particular way—that is, to contrast specifically with long-term memorial processes. Thus, 
as they point out, perceptual processes include the maintenance of representations of
just-presented durations in working memory. In the current paper, we also use the terms
perceptual and mnemonic in this way.
Allan and Gerhardt (2001) compared performance on the two types of bisection task used
by Rodriguez-Girones and Kacelnik (2001), but they also included the traditional bisection
task in which participants were pre-exposed to the standards before each block of testing,
but did not encounter them again during test trials. In contrast to Rodriguez-Girones and
Kacelnik, Allan and Gerhardt found that overall level of performance was very similar in all
three bisection tasks, but that the location of the bisection point was affected by type of task.
Like Wearden and Bray (2001), they also found good superimposition across different stim-
ulus ranges in all tasks. The fact that level of performance on the traditional bisection task
was similar to that on a bisection task in which there were no fixed standards was interpreted
as indicating that, contrary to the assumptions of many models of bisection, participants do
not actually compare test stimuli to stored long-term memory representations of the
standards in the traditional task. Rather, test stimuli are assumed to be compared with a
single criterion duration in both types of task (see also Allan, 2002; Wearden & Ferrara,
1995). Allan and Gerhardt modelled their data by assuming that the primary source of scalar
variability in timing was perceptual variability, but that provision of fixed standards either
before or during test trials can affect the criterion to which test stimuli are compared.
Thus, a number of recent studies with human adults have used timing tasks in which
there are no fixed standards in order to examine whether timing has scalar properties under
such circumstances and to gain insight into the contribution of perceptual relative to
mnemonic processes to variability in timing. The present paper takes advantage of the same
basic methodology but for a novel purpose: examination of the possible contributions of per-
ceptual and mnemonic processes to developmental improvements in timing. We devised two
tasks that resembled those of Rodriguez-Girones and Kacelnik (2001) and Wearden and
Bray (2001; Exp. 3). We chose variants of the temporal generalization task because it is rel-
atively easy to interpret data on this task compared to the bisection task, the theoretical
interpretation of which is the subject of intense debate. The same type of test trial was used
in both of our temporal generalization tasks: Participants were presented with a pair of
stimuli and had to judge whether or not the stimuli were of the same duration. In the
repeated standard task, one of the two stimuli was always a standard stimulus that participants
had been exposed to before the test trials began. The ratio of test comparison stimulus to the
696 McCORMACK ET AL.
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standard was always 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5, or 1.75, enabling generalization gradients to
be plotted as a function of comparison-to-standard ratio. In the episodic task, the ratio
between the two stimuli was again always taken from the same set of values (i.e., ranging
from 0.25 to 1.75), but no stimulus duration was ever repeated. Instead, one stimulus from
the pair was drawn from a particular distribution of durations. To examine the scalar
property of timing under these circumstances, two different duration distributions were
used in the episodic task (“short” and “long” ranges), and two different standards were used
in the repeated standard task. These standards were in fact the mean durations of the short
and long ranges in the episodic task.
We can make the following predictions. First, if perceptual variance is scalar in nature, we
should expect to replicate previous findings with adults, in that similar generalization gradi-
ents should be obtained for the two stimulus ranges in both the episodic task and the repeated
standard task (i.e., we should see superimposition even in the absence of reference memory,
Allan, 2002; Allan & Gerhardt, 2001; Wearden & Bray, 2001). Superimposition is predicted
for the groups of children as well as adults, given that previous findings suggest that timing
is scalar even in young children (Droit-Volet, 2002; Droit-Volet et al., 2001). Second, if devel-
opmental differences are due to changes in levels of perceptual variance rather than simply
changes in mnemonic variance, age differences should be found on the episodic task (in which
long-term memory plays no role) as well as on the repeated standard task.
The third issue concerns the predicted levels of performance on the episodic task relative
to the repeated standard task. The findings of Rodriguez-Girones and Kacelnik (2001) lead
to the prediction of better performance on the repeated standard task, which would indicate
that relatively precise long-term memory representations can be used to moderate relatively
noisy perceptual processes on this task. However, in contrast, Allan and Gerhardt’s (2001)
findings lead to the expectation that performance levels should be similar on both tasks, indi-
cating that long-term memories are not recruited in the repeated standard task. A further
possibility is that the age groups may differ in the extent to which they actually recruit
the long-term memory representation of the standard in the repeated standard task. As
Rodriguez-Girones and Kacelnik point out, the use of reference memory is in some sense
optional in such a task, given that the standard is repeated on every trial. If groups differ in
their use of reference memory in the repeated standard task, we might expect to see variation
across age groups in any differences in levels of performance between that task and the
episodic task.
Method
Participants
A total of 26 five-year-olds (M 5;2, range 4;11–5;8; 10 males and 16 females), 26 ten-year-olds
(M 10;3, range 9;5–10;7; 15 males and 11 females), and 25 adults (13 males and 12 females) com-
pleted the repeated standard task. A total of 26 five-year-olds (M 5;1, range 4;8–5;6; 15 males and
11 females), 26 ten-year-olds (M 10;3, range 9;7–10;6; 13 males and 13 females), and 26 adults
(10 males and 16 females) completed the episodic task. Children were recruited from primary schools
in Birmingham, UK, and were tested individually in a quiet room in their schools. Adult participants
were primarily undergraduates from the University of Warwick, who took part voluntarily and were
paid 4 pounds sterling for their participation.
EPISODIC TEMPORAL GENERALIZATION  697
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Materials
An Apple Macintosh laptop was used to present the auditory and visual stimuli, with stimulus 
presentation controlled by the Psyscope computer program. The auditory stimuli were 500-Hz pure
tones that varied in duration; these were presented through external speakers attached to the computer.
The visual stimuli consisted of cartoon images of a pair of green birds that were identical except for
their size.
Procedure
In the repeated standard task, participants completed two generalization tasks, the first with a
“short” standard of 495 ms and the second with a “long” standard of 825 ms. The comparison
durations in both tasks had ratios of 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5, or 1.75 to the standard. Participants
completed six blocks of seven trials in each task, with each block of trials containing one example of
each comparison ratio. Each trial began with the appearance of the larger of the two cartoon birds on
the left hand side of the computer screen. This bird remained on the screen for 3 s in total. After this
bird had been on the screen for 500 ms, the standard stimulus was presented. As soon as the larger bird
disappeared from the screen, a second smaller bird appeared on the right hand side of the screen. This
bird remained on the screen until the participant keyed in a response. At a given interval after the
appearance of the second bird, the comparison stimulus was presented. This interval varied randomly
between 400 and 600 ms.
At the start of the experiment, the structure of each trial was demonstrated to participants in an
initial block consisting of six trials. In particular, it was explained to the participants that the larger bird
was “mummy” bird and that the smaller bird was “baby” bird and that mummy bird was trying to
teach baby bird to sing. Participants were encouraged to help baby bird by informing him when he had
correctly made the same sound as mummy bird and when he had incorrectly made a different sound
to mummy bird. It was then explained that participants could inform baby bird by pressing a “same”
or “different” button on the computer. After the initial demonstration block, participants received two
training blocks of six trials in which they received feedback about whether baby bird’s sounds were the
same as or different from mummy bird’s sounds. Prior to the blocks of trials featuring the short stan-
dard, participants were informed that mummy bird would be making a short sound for baby bird to
copy. In contrast, prior to the blocks of trials featuring the long standard, participants were informed
that mummy bird would be making a long sound for baby bird to copy. Half of the participants were
presented with blocks of trials featuring the short standard first, and half of the participants were
presented with blocks of trials featuring the long standard first. Apart from the demonstration and
practice blocks, no feedback was given in this or in the episodic task.
In the episodic task, the sample stimulus was randomly drawn from either a “short” set or a “long”
set. Participants received 42 trials in which the sample stimulus was drawn from the short set, and
42 trials in which it was drawn from the long set, with half the participants receiving the short trials
first, and half the participants receiving the long trials first. The shortest sample stimulus in the short
set was 369 ms, with the other stimuli in the set increasing in 6-ms increments up to 615 ms. The short-
est sample stimulus in the long set was 615 ms, with the other stimuli in the set increasing in 10-ms
increments up to 1,025 ms. In the episodic task, the comparison durations had ratios of 0.25, 0.5, 0.75,
1, 1.25, 1.5, or 1.75 to the sample, with six examples of each ratio for each range. In all other respects
the trial and block structure for the episodic task was identical to that employed on the repeated
standard task. The instructions for the episodic task were also identical to that for the repeated
standard task. Before the short trials, participants were told that mummy bird would be making some
short sounds for baby bird to copy, and before the long trials they were told that she would be making
some long sounds for baby bird to copy.
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Results
Figure 1 shows the proportion of positive responses in the episodic task as a function of
comparison-to-sample ratio for each age-group; Figure 2 shows the proportion of positive
responses in the repeated standard task as a function of comparison-to-standard ratio for
each age group.
In the episodic task, there appear to be age-related improvements in performance,
particularly between the youngest age group and the two older groups, with the youngest
age group showing less steep gradients. Superimposition is generally good across the three
EPISODIC TEMPORAL GENERALIZATION  699
Figure 2. Temporal generalization gradients from the repeated standard task. The mean proportion of positive
responses is plotted against comparison/standard ratio. Left, centre, and right panels show data from the 5-year-
olds, 10-year-olds, and adults, respectively. Within each panel data obtained from the short and long duration
ranges are shown separately.
Figure 1. Temporal generalization gradients from the episodic task. The mean proportion of positive responses
(indicating that the two stimuli on the trial have the same duration) is plotted against comparison/sample ratio. Left
panel: data from 5-year-olds. Centre panel: data from 10-year-olds. Right panel: data from adults. Within each panel
data are shown separately from the short and long duration ranges used.
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age groups. A three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) of these data, with a between-
subjects factor of age group and within-subjects factors of ratio (0.25–1.75) and range (short
vs. long), confirmed these observations.1 The main effect of age group was significant, F(2,
75) 5.69, p .01, indicating that the groups differed in overall number of positive
responses. The interaction between age group and ratio was also significant, F(8.54,
450) 11.46, p .001, indicating age differences in the steepness of the generalization gra-
dients and thus in overall levels of performance. The effect of range just reached significance,
F(1, 75)4.10, p .05, indicating a difference in the overall number of positive responses
between the two ranges. However, the interaction between range and ratio was not signifi-
cant, F(4.32, 450) 1.78, p .05, indicating that the shapes of the generalization gradients
were similar for the short and long ranges (i.e., that there was superimposition).
Furthermore, the three-way interaction between age, range, and ratio was also not significant,
F(8.63, 450) 1.36, p .05. Thus, the analyses confirm that there was age-related
improvement on the episodic task and that superimposition was found.
For the repeated standard task, it can be seen that performance also improves with age,
with the youngest group having less steep generalization gradients than the two older groups.
Superimposition again appears generally good for each of the age groups. A repeated mea-
sures ANOVA was carried out on the proportion of positive responses, with a between-
subjects factor of age group and within-subjects factors of ratio (0.25–1.75) and range (short
vs. long). The main effect of age group was significant, F(2, 74) 4.38, p .02, as was the
interaction between age group and ratio, F(8.07, 444) 5.94, p .001, indicating changes in
overall levels of performance. The main effect of range was not significant (F 1), indicat-
ing similar levels of positive responses in both ranges, but the interaction between range and
ratio was significant, F(3.93, 444) 2.92, p .05, as was the three-way interaction between
range, ratio, and age, F(7.87, 444) 2.73, p .01. Further analysis revealed that the inter-
action between ratio and range was not significant for the adult group, F(2.99, 144) 2.28,
p .05, and only marginally significant for the 10-year-old group, F(3.44, 150)2.63, p .05,
but significant for the youngest group, F(3.40, 150) 3.42, p .05. Post hoc tests showed
that the difference between ranges was significant only at the 0.75 and the 1 ratio for the
5-year-olds and at the 1.25 ratio for the 10-year-olds (a significance level of p .05 was set
for these analyses). Thus, superimposition was excellent for the adults and reasonably good
for the two groups of children.
Cross-task comparisons. In order to compare performance across task, the data were col-
lapsed over the short and the long ranges. Figure 3 shows the performance of each age group
across the two tasks, with the data collapsed across range. It can be seen that the groups of
adults and 10-year-olds performed at remarkably similar levels across the tasks. However, the
5-year-old group who completed the repeated standard task appear to perform more accu-
rately than those who completed the episodic task. A two-way ANOVA was conducted on
proportion of positive responses, with a between-subjects factor of age group and task and
700 McCORMACK ET AL.
1In this and subsequent ANOVAs, there was some evidence of departure from the sphericity assumption (ε values
ranged from .49 to .72). Thus, all reported degrees of freedom and probability values have been adjusted using the
Greenhouse–Geisser correction.
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a within-subjects factor of ratio. The interaction between ratio and task was significant,
F(4.26, 894) 3.66, p .001, indicating task differences in overall levels of performance.
However, the three-way interaction between ratio, age, and task was also significant, F(8.53,
894) 3.85, p .001. Further analysis showed that the interaction between task and ratio
was not significant for the adult group, F(4.04, 294) 1.12, p .05. This interaction was
significant for the 10-year-old group, F(3.12, 300) 5.06, p .01; however, t tests showed
that the task difference was only significant for the 0.5 ratio, t(50) 2.07, p .05, and the
0.75 ratio, t(50) 4.13, p .05. Participants made more erroneous positive responses in
episodic task on these ratios, although it can be seen from Figure 3 that performance was
extremely similar for all other ratios. The interaction between task and ratio was significant
for the 5-year-old group, F(4.16, 300) 4.38, p .01, with t tests showing that the task 
difference was significant for all ratios, t(50) 2, p .05, with the exception of the 0.75 
and 1.25 ratios.
Discussion
Consistent with the findings of previous similar studies (Allan, 2002; Allan & Gerhardt,
2001; Wearden & Bray, 2001) we found evidence that perceptual processes exhibit the scalar
property that is central to SET models of timing. Superimposition of performance across
two stimulus ranges was good for all groups in the episodic task, in which no long-term
memory representations of standards could be used. Superimposition was also reasonably
good in the repeated standard task. Although the groups of children (in particular, the
5-year-old group) showed a small amount of deviation from superimposition in this task (see
Figure 2), this deviation was not systematic. Thus, we attribute this to the higher probability
of obtaining noisy data from young children, rather than to a qualitative difference in the
properties of temporal processes in this group. Droit-Volet and Wearden (2001) found even
more marked deviation from superimposition in their study of temporal bisection in
children, but since the deviation was not systematic they did not take it as evidence against
EPISODIC TEMPORAL GENERALIZATION  701
Figure 3. Temporal generalization gradients from both the episodic task and the repeated standard task, collapsed
across short and long duration ranges. The mean proportion of positive responses is plotted against comparison/
standard ratio. Left, centre, and right panels show data from the 5-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults, respectively.
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the claim that timing is scalar in children. Indeed, Droit-Volet et al. (2001) found good
superimposition across two very different stimulus ranges in a study of temporal general-
ization using groups of children as young as 3 years old, as did Droit-Volet (2002). Thus, the
general picture of findings would suggest that timing can reasonably be assumed to have the
scalar property in children as well as adults.
Developmental improvements in performance were found on both the episodic task and
the repeated standard task. The finding that performance improves developmentally on a
timing task even when there is no long-term memory component to the task implies that
future developmental models of timing must consider perceptual as well as mnemonic
changes. Some previous developmental models of timing within the SET framework have
assumed either perceptual variance with error-free long-term memory (McCormack et al.,
1999), or mnemonic variance with error-free perception (Droit-Volet et al., 2001). Our find-
ings suggest that error-free, developmentally invariant perception cannot be assumed.
However, it remains to be established exactly which aspects of the set of processes that we
have categorized here as “perceptual” change developmentally. Recently, Droit-Volet (2003)
has found that alerting young children to the impending onset of to-be-timed stimuli
improved performance, and argued that the attentional processes that trigger the timing of
stimuli are poorer in young children. Although attentional processes may indeed contribute
to developmental change, we note that what we have categorized for present purposes as per-
ceptual processes include not only the clock processes that are used to time durations, but the
processes involved in the maintenance of to-be-compared durations in short-term memory.
These short-term memory processes may also change developmentally.
We now turn to the cross-task comparisons. The findings from the groups of adults and
10-year-olds resemble those of Allan and Gerhardt (2001), who found similar levels of per-
formance in tasks with or without fixed standards. In this respect our results differ from
those of Rodriguez-Girones and Kacelnik (2001), who found better performance on a repeated
standard task. Allan and Gerhardt point out, however, that the cross-task comparisons in the
Rodriguez-Girones and Kacelnik study might be misleading because the ranges of the stimu-
lus durations in the two tasks were not equated. In the current study, we attempted to equate
for stimulus range across the tasks.
Different levels of performance on the tasks can be interpreted as reflecting the variabil-
ity of perceptual processes relative to mnemonic process. Similar levels of cross-task perfor-
mance are interpreted as indicating that perceptual processes are not associated with higher
levels of noise than mnemonic processes. If mnemonic processes were less noisy than per-
ceptual ones, then participants would be able to use such processes to moderate perceptual
variance, leading to better performance on the repeated standard task. In fact, only the
5-year-old group showed any marked advantage from the presence of a fixed standard in the
repeated standard task. The 10-year-old group showed a limited advantage from the pres-
ence of a fixed standard, and the adult groups performed very similarly on both tasks. This
would suggest that one important developmental change may be the magnitude of percep-
tual variance relative to mnemonic variance. It seems possible that perceptual processes are
particularly noisy in young children, perhaps due to poor attentional skills, as Droit-Volet
(2003) has suggested.
The findings of the current study suggest that an important aim of future developmen-
tal research should be to partition developmental changes in variance into changes in either
702 McCORMACK ET AL.
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perceptual or mnemonic variance and then to further examine which specific aspects of
perceptual and memory processes contribute to developmental change. The current experiment
was not designed to enable such partitioning; rather, its findings simply rule out the possibility
that developmental changes are entirely due to changes in mnemonic variance. However, it is
a strength of the SET framework that it allows for the construction of formal models that
potentially separate different perceptual and mnemonic sources of variance. Although it may
not be straightforward to do so, future studies of developmental changes in timing could
attempt to exploit this strength, in order to yield a more detailed account of the 
specific processes that underpin developmental improvements in timing abilities.
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